	2010 1110
EXhibit	2013-CP-21-1195
12	Forms - Candi
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA	FORM 5 COPY ORIGINAL
County of Lloren Co SC	
sounty of Prence SC) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Peters broken 1 172039	Notice AND Motion
Full name and prison number (if any) of Applicant	For New trial pursuant
V.	to scarp 29(b) AND
Start O.S.	S, C COOR AND TO - 25-45 APPLICATION FOR
State of South Carolina) POST-CONVICTION
SISSUE STATE OF THE STATE OF TH	(S/A/ E Vol/Ahren 3311 no
- 1888 - 1888 - 1888	7 7 33 0 5 5 24 3 9 (26 a)
INSTRUCTIONS	115 Pagalonia
The order for this application to receive con	READ CCAREFULLY 7 = 27 - 00 nsideration by the Court, it shall be in writing (legibly int and verified (notarized), and it shall set forth in large or on an additional way furnish his answer.
concise form the answers to each applicable quest	nsideration by the Court, it shall be in writing (legibly int and verified (notarized), and it shall set forth in league or on an additional page.
clear to which question any such continued answer	ion. If necessary, applicant may furnish his answer page or on an additional page. Applicant shall make
Since or any	
therein may serve as the basis of prosecution and c exercise care to assure that all answers are true and	onviction of perjury. Applicants should, therefore
If the applications	
of the form) setting forth information which established costs of the proceedings. When the application Clerk of Court for the County in which the applican	shed that applicant will be unable to pay the force
the county in which the applican	t was convicted.
Place of detention	
430 vaktaus Pa.	PIR 2010 PRIZER 2450)
Court which imposed	sentence 13th hull cont
CSFLUIT 180 N. Irby	Sf Florence sc 2450)
3. Name(s) of co-defendant(s) (if any)	
	upon which and the offenses for which in the state of the
4. The indictment number or numbers (if known)	upon which and the extra the last the l
	F . 3 . 5 . 9 . 5 . 9 . 5 . 9 . 9 . 9 . 9 . 9
	5.303

Date Filed 09/26/14 Entry Number 11-10

Page 1 of 32

6:14-cv-03518-TMC

sentence was imposed:
(a) April 9th 1991 (90-65-21-1187)
(b) April 9th 1991 (9n-65-21=490)
(1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1
$\frac{1}{1}$ $\frac{1}$
The date upon which sentence was imposed and the terms of the sentence:
(a) April 9,1991 GS-1187 GS-1188-
(6) G3-95 Europet Du Vous Auit 1 See 4xhibits)
(c) Standarsposition may 7 14200
6. Check whether a finding of guilty was made: 45
(a) after a plea of guilty $\Lambda\Lambda$ \\ $3 + 1 = 1000$
(b) after a plea of not guilty NUV 71 (947
(c) after a plea of nolo contendere
7. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence?
8. If you answered yes to (7), list: $\frac{1991}{r/u}$ by Jury
(a) the names of each Court to which you appealed:
i. South carolina trust of America
ii.
iii.
(b) the result in each such Court to which you appealed:
$i = \frac{1}{2} unt 14 (990)$
ii. Appene Curt
iii.
and of each such result:
i
ii.

	1	iii.
	((d) if known, citations of any written opinion or orders entered pursuant to such results:
	i.	opinion of orders entered pursuant to such results:
	ii	
	iii	
9.	If	you answered no to (7), state your reasons for not so appealing:
	(a)	April 9 1441 4 with Dla
	(b)	
	(c)	
10.	Stat	e concisely the grounds on which area.
	cust	te concisely the grounds on which you base your allegation that you are being held in ody unlawfully:
	(a)	
	(b)	State v. Johnson (2001) wriften notice to expersed SCRUP 29(6)
	(c)	SCRCP 29(b) in AFFACTIVE (WASALE)
11.	State	concisely and in the same order the formall is
	in (10	concisely and in the same order the facts which support each of the grounds set out
((a)	Sty exhibit X - V 2
• • •	(b)	5-1-1 +xh; h: f +> 27 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
((c)	Set thisifs
12. P	rior to	this application have you filed with respect to this conviction:
(a	ı)	any petition in a State Court under State
(b)	any petition in a State Court under South Carolina Law?
	1	any petition in State or Federal Courts for habeas corpus or post-convictions
(c)		7 (-
	ii	any petition in the United States Supreme Court for certiorari other than petitions,
		fany, already specified in (8)?

	(d) any other petitions, motions or applications in this or any other Court? NO
13.	If you answered yes to any part of (12), list with respect to each petition, motion or
	application:
	(a) the specific nature thereof:
	i
;	i. 2241
i	ii.
i	V
. (1	the name and location of the Court in which each was filed:
i.	district court of Carrier
ii.	4th circuit count uf Annals
iii	
iv.	
(c)	the disposition thereof:
i.	dismess without Arelalise
ii.	dismissed without reason with circuit
iii.	THE COUNTY
iv.	
(d)	the date of each such disposition:
i.	NIA
ii.	
iii.	
iv.	
(e)	if known, citations of any written opinions or orders entered pursuant to each such
	disposition:
i.	

ii.
iii.
iv.
14. Has any ground and S
14. Has any ground set forth in (10) been previously presented to this or any other Court, State of Federal, in any petition metics.
State of Federal, in any petition, motion or application which you have filed?
Ves
15. If you answered "yes" to (14) identify:
(a) which grounds have been presented:
i. all except illead plan
ii. AND SCREED 29(6) ALL
iii. matian
(b) the proceedings in which each ground was raised:
ii.
iii.
any ground set forth in (10) has not previously to
state concisely the reasons t
(a) all grunds in present applications (b) under motalis Vi united confine
(b) was er mc Earle we graph cally
(c) and after drs covered by an attorney of an instance Scene
at any time during the course of γ
(b) your trial, if any? Nov 7, 1997 Vas -
Public defenders of the time.
MAIIC OFFERD IN OF The Lime.
Sue clarks records

(c) your sentencing?
(d) your appeal, if any, from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence?
April 1 1949 frin
(e) preparation, presentation or consideration of any petitions, motions or applications
with respect to this conviction, which you filed?
18. If you answered yes to one or more parts of (17), list:
(a) the name and address of each attorney who represented you:
i John Jeparfiny
TUPP TUCKER 12 th judicial) circuit
ii. July 19th Judicial Count
Dilam p. clare populate defense
iii. Glan Ellsuff por Flurtner se
AMY WISE PET Flurence SI
(b) the proceedings at which each such attorney represented you:
i. John Jeparting poril 9, 1991
- Du New plas Sture Tradus Toba
ii. wall to TODD Tucker, Juhn
13+1 during NUV 7, 1497 frial,
iii. Aileen p. clare Appmet
differenty Tava Taryel
19. State clearly the relief you seek in filing this application:
SCREP MUTIUM For New Frial
(m) e 29(b) after disco vired
MCFalt V Martingrandum und
Are you now under sentence from any other court that you have not challenged?
- NONE

APPLICATION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PAYMENT OF COSTS AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT THEREOF

I, _______hereby apply for leave to proceed in this action without prepayment of fees or costs or security therefore. In support of my application I declare under penalty or perjury that the following facts are true:

- (1) I am the applicant in this action and I believe I am entitled to redress.
- (2) Because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or give security thereof.

Profes Over Tr Applicant

Notary Public

My Commission Expires: 4-26-2020

No notary Avaible En Aft Adams Polarest orbit

County of Forence 50213	<u>[4</u>]	VERIFICATIO	ON	
I, depose and say that I have subscribed to the that is includes every ground known to me for sentence attacked in this application; and that	foregoing application or vacating, setting as the matters and alle	n; that I know the	orn upon my oath contents thereof the conviction a	f;
	Poped	Sultr		
SWORN to and subscribed before me this 2 day of 1981 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 20	9 <u>12</u> 3		2013 MAY -2 OCCP & FLORENCE CO	
			SHEAR GS	

CERTIFIED: A TRUE COPY

CERTIFIED: A TRUE COPY

CLERY OF COUNTY, S.C.

CLERY OF COUNTY, S.C.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA) IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS
COUNTY OF FLORENCE) C/A No.
	_
Robert Graham, Jr.,	, 2013-CP-21-1195
Applicant,)
)
vs.)
)
State of South Carolina,)
Respondent.	ORDER ORDER
It appearing that t	
11 5 0	
desirous of and qualifies	for an appointment of an attorney,
NOW THEREFORE	
THEREFORE	
IT IS ORDERED that th	on Office of the mi
Defender is hereby appoint	e Office of the Florence County Public ted to represent the Applicant.
and the second appoint	ted to represent the Applicant.
Attorney:	
	· ·
	· ·
	·
DATED: April, 2013	
D.1.	RESIDING JUDGE, TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF FLORENCE, S.C.)	TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Robert Graham Jr.,)	C/A NO.:
Applicant,)	2013-CP-21-1195
)	
vs.)	201 F
)	2013 HAY CONNIE FLORES
State of South Carolina,)	ECT I
Respondent	_)	SUMMONS PAPER NO
		PH SH
		17 19 49 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19

You are summoned as required by this complaint to fulfil as named Respondent to this action and complaint, a copy of which is herewith served upon you, and to serve a copy of your answer to complaint upon Applicant; Robert Graham Jr., #178039 at Perry Correctional Institution Q-1-A 206/ 430 Oaklawn Road/ Pelzer, 29669, within thirty (30) days after service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service and if you fail to answer the complaint, judgement by default will be rendered.

RECEIVE

APR 2 2 2013

April 22, 2013 Florence, S.C.

P.C.I. MAILROOM

(1) OSS/Affy Gen' RECEIVED melody Brown P. O. Bux 11549 P.C.I. MAILROOM Sulscitur Edward clement

To: Yerk mrs! circuit, Connie Risell

msc-Eflorence sc ZIP 29501 see aftachel exhibits

THE HONORABLE CONNIE R. BELL CLERK OF COURT, FLORENCE COUNTY 180 NORTH IRBY STREET

MSC-E FLORENCE, S.C. 29501

Robert Graham Jr.,)
Applicant,)

)

State of South Carolina,)

Respondent e.f. (44)

vs.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF NEW TRIAL, MOTION SCRCP
RULE 29 AND 60
SCRCP AND RULE 8 FOR TO SERVIDENTIARY HEARING

2013-cp-21-1195

Applicant, Robert Graham Jr., (por-se) litigant call to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant after discovered evidence, the pulling and viewing of all records, indictments, warrants, exhibits, and sheet sentencing with regards to April 9, 1991, multiple 20 year negotiated guilty plea, as for rather or not the plea was for one (1) single deposition, conviction, or if it was for two or more prior intervening convictions for sentencing purposes. See exhibit 1-0-65, 41-65, 40-65

The reason for this Motion is to have the Court take judicial notice of the courts and appeals courts interpretation as to how many intervening new convictions Applicant had after or on the date of April 9, 1991 trial by jury where the prosecutor counted indictment numbers 90-GS-21-1187, 90-GS-21-1188, 90-GS-21-95, from April 9, 1991 plea as three (3) April 9, 1991 convictions for sentencing purposes, though multiple charges. Notice exhibit

The indictments numbers prosecutor put into the record at trial, 90-GS-21-1188, 91-GS-21-95, 90-GS-1188, were all established to be pled to at the same time, on the same day without argument which was April 9, 1991 before Honorable John Wallace. Still the April 9, 1991 multiple guilty plea indictments

were separated and counted as numerous different intervening arrests. The State has alleged that it complied with the mandatory requirements under statute S.C. Code Ann. §17-25-45(H), to have factually and fruitfully served Graham the recidivist notice of intent document in writing ten (10) days prior to the trial as the general assembly mandated, but the copy Applicant received eight years after trial bears no such signature of defendant Robert Graham Jr. exist. See Johnson v. State (2001).

Wherefore, the motion to take judicial notice of the circuit court clerk's records is properly and imperative to establish sufficient evidence under the motion for relief to be granted pursuant to Gibson v. State, 334 S.C. 515, 514 S.E.2d 320 (1997). Applicant never would have pled guilty to the multiple offenses at April 9, 1991 had plea counsel advised him that seven (7) or ten years later, if Applicant was ever charged with anything else of the same that the court would use that 20 years plea to enhance his punishment to a greater and more severe penalty, this was not known to Applicant at plea, neither was it known to Applicant at 1997 trial by jury, or previous PCR hearing date June 2002, that the indictment numbers 5. Were used at trial as two or more prior distinct intervening arrests wereactually all ran [concurrent] by Judge John Waller, plead to at the [same time] sentenced run concurrently with all the indictment numbers prosecutor placed into the record at trial on November 7, 1997, S.C. Code Ann. 17-25-45(H) annotated is a forced statue for life without parole, where priors used to enhance a second degree nonviolent burglary into two or more priors for first degree enhanced penalty this was highly prejudicial to due process of law, had Applicant known this at trial he would had said so.

ARGUMENT I SUPPORTING FACTS

Exhibits 1-5 attached, proves, Applicant at November 7, 1997 trial only had one prior conviction, deposition for sentencing purposes. Notice 1997 trial indictment #97-GS-21-742, 11-7-97. See on the parole boards [exhibit #5] calculations of sentences; (April) 4-9-91, trial judge sentence Applicant outside the scope of the [three strike] requirements, to life without parole. Evidence shows Applicant at 1997 trial did not for sentencing purposes have [two or more] priors. Applicant is serving an illegal, excessive miscalculated sentence, which exceeds the guidelines promulgated by the United States Supreme Court, and Federal guidelines for sentencing under the recidivist statute South Carblina sentencing record summary report dated exhibit XXZ it shows Applicant didn't requirements for life without parole because records show he factually and legally was only convicted once, April 9, 1991. Trial evidence shows it made one deposition, Applicant's sentence is successive by statutory state and federal guidelines for sentencing purposes. Graham cannot meet career offender guidelines under state arguments S.C. Code Ann. §17-25-45(H) counsels notice under wohnson ruling sufficent must have been

Expceptional Grossly Proportionate Sentence Enhancement Beyond The Maximum Penalty Described By State And Federal Statutory Law, To Include The United States Supreme Court.

S.C. Code Ann. §17-25-45(H) where the court and state sentence Graham to life without the possibility of parole, without complying with the unambiguous required language in the statute, sentence was exceptional to federal guidelines. The statutory requirements before court could impose the penalty of life without possibility of parole under 17-25-45(H). It was mandatory

that (both) Graham (defendant) and counsel was prescribed to have been served in [writing] the notice of states intention to seek life without possibility of parole, ten (10) days in writing prior to trial. See Johnson v. State (2001) citations omitted, see exhibit #1, proffers the notice document was [served] in [writing] on attorney Tucker and John Bell, but nowhere on the instrument in question does [defendant] required signature name appear, per the general assembly's intention, hence, enhancement of offenses at the same time involving the burglary into a dwelling. This argument would still fail because the indictment or the necessary aggravating circumstances mandated to secure a sentence enhancement were never submitted to the jury and because nothing in the indictments indicated the generic use of the word dwelling in terms of aggravating circumstances for enhancement must be charged to the jury. See transcript pg. 83, lines 15-25, pg. 84, lines 1-4.

The Honorable Hicks Harwell decline to show the jury the indictment or to instruct them on the aggravating circumstances necessary to prove the priors before submitting the November 7, 1997 charges to the jury, this deprived court of recidivist enhancement authority under Blake v. Washington, U.S. S.Ct. Citations omitted.

ARGUMENT III

Defendant's Offense Involving Conduct That Presents A Serious Potential Risk Of Physical Injury As Attempted By State To Establish In The Vague Language Of Both April 9, 1991 Guilty Plea, And The Second November 7, 1997 Trial Fails Muster Test.

South Carolina second degree burglary does not categorically as a [crime of violence] by involving conduct that presents a serious potential alleged risk of danger or injury to another. The crime at hand fails to [satisfy] the residual clause because it in the proffered indictments presents not the same risk of generic burglary of a dwelling. Graham's indictments of burglary could only present a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another for sentencing enhancement (purposes) "if it is similar in [kind] as well as in [degree] of risk posed to the enumerated offenses." United States v. Mosely, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 158, 1585, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008).

The risks of the states attempt to characterize Graham as a career violent habitual offender only applied in theory. The true main risk of burglary arises not from the simple act of some kind of wrong doing entering anothers property, but from the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation between burglary and third party whether an occupant, a police or bystander who comes to investigate because the finders of fact never got to view the evidence and charges against defendant in the April 9, 1991 multiple plea offense to determine if the elements of danger or at risk to injury of others existed for enhancement based upon priors, James, 550 U.S. at 203, 127 S.Ct. 1586.

Applicant's sentence was grossly without penal authority. Had Graham known about the indictment numbers mentioned in the body of notice document he would have brought these arguments for the sentencing courts attention. This was highly prejudicial to a fundamental due process of law sentence under the Fourteenth Amendment, Court nor State had any statutory authority for enhancement, 17-25-45(H).

ARGUMENT IV UNCONSTITUTIONAL SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT

The charging documents for Graham's burglary convictions do not contain enough to make the burglary conviction a crime of [evidence] for guidelines career offender purposes. Although a sentencing court may generally only rely upon statutory definitions of prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions to determine whether a sentence should be enhanced, in case where the statutory definition is ambiguous, a court [is permitted to] go beyond the mere facts of convictions and examine the charge papers or jury instructions to determine whether the jury necessarily found in the requisite

elements of an offense that would qualify for a federal sentencing enhancement. United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 2001) quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143.

A sentencing Court in this situation must examine the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable record of judicial information. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), questioning of guilty pleas is whether court documents establish that the defendant necessarily admitted the elements of a predicate offense through his plea. United States v. Medinat Al Maguer, 559 F.3d 420, 422 (6th Cir. 2009).

The government is subject to argue that even if Graham's second degree burglary in South Carolina does reflect the absent of violence, it may assert it still categorically qualified as a crime, or a second offense, even under the two strike guidelines, however, the South Carolina indictments numbers 90-GS-21-1188, 91-GS-21-95, 90-GS-21-1187 were separated to count as numerous dispositions, although records, plea agreement, dates and the indictments, and sentencing documents make clear defendant was charged, and pled to above April 9, 1991.

The state used a suggestion of risk arised from innocent people appeared just for the placing of the April 9, 1991 prior in the record. Not only did the jurist not try the facts of the defendant's criminal history for enhancement purposes, they only heard testimony about the November 7, 1997 previous charge at trial, and because of such the state's assertion that defendant qualifies as a career violent offender for sentence enhancement simply cannot apply. The armed career criminal act was not present here to trigger the enhancement penalties mandated by ACCA. see Begay.

ARGUMENT V MISSOURI V. FRYE DECIDED MARCH 21, 2012

Probably the most telling error of law, and judicial prejudice in which this court will find, is that Applicant received unprecedent ineffective assistance of counsels during all pre-trial, post-trial, preindictment collateral stages, which is what ultimately led to his excessive miscalculated life sentence without possibility of parole.

Our esteemed United States Supreme Court, not even six (6) months ago, again re-emphasized their precedent, novelty, that Applicant has a sixth amendment constitutional guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel extending even to plea negotiations, that are lapsed or are rejected.

That right applies to all critical stages of criminal proceedings with ensuring Applicant wasn't pleading April 9, 1991 to more prior arrest and intervening deposition that he was informed before sentencing and at November 7, 1997, attorneys of record had a duty and owed a duty to Applicant not to all him to stand before a judge and be sentenced outside the state and federal statutory guidelines.

MARTINEZ V. RYAN DECIDED MARCH 20, 2012

Where under state law, ineffective of attorney claims during initial-review, collateral proceedings, even during post-trial motions, counsels prejudiced Applicant by not investigating priors used at sentencing to see if he statutorily had two or more priors before sentencing.

These being procedural and substantial constitutional claims, court should take judicial notice of entire record, viewing initial plea of April 9, 1991, November 7, 1997, of attorneys representations, arraignments, interrogations, entry of guilty

plea to determine if attorneys factually contributed to a Strickland v. Washington, two prong prejudice for prejudicial incompetent plea and trial attorneys during plea and sentencing that should have been caught before sentencing or during deliberations, Applicant would have never demanded a trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52.

The Rule 35 FCRP Motion extends beyond after discovered evidence doctrine. For sentencing purposes Applicant has exhausted all remedies, and factually has been fighting his case faithfully from imposition of sentencing. See Lafler v. Cooper, 376 Fed. APPX. 563, vacated and remanded (2012).

Just as in the Lafler case, Applicant received deficient performance and has shown but for attorneys performance there is a reasonable probability it aided to his receiving as exceptional statutory state and federal U.S. Supreme Court illegal excessive life sentence without the possibility of parole, against the guidelines established for enhancement. Motion for new trial is supported by exhibits, records with sentencing for plea and illegal enhancement constitutes evidentiary hearing procedures incorporated with Rule 35 FRCP.

ARGUMENT VI GUILTY PLEA

Applicant in a guilty hearing must be sworn to. See Nesbit v. U.S., 773 F.Supp. 795.

The record in this case is clear, the Applicant was not "sworn in" pursuant to Rule 603 which is an indisputable violation of the procedural due process guarantee afforded to every person accused. The term "every witness" encompasses persons who witness against themselves at a guilty plea hearing because it is an admission of conduct. This is affer his covered exilence follows.

This claim is extraordinary to this Court based on the fact that there is no domestic precedent addressing this issue of which stands on all fours, and this most Honorable Court should take this opportunity to stop such blatant violations and disregard of procedure and say what the law is in this matter.

ARGUMENT VII

Furthermore, the Applicant's 5th and 14th amendment rights violated by the lack of a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Specifically, the right against compulsory self-incrimination and the right to confront one's accusers. This error is clearly of magnitude so much so that the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed this issue in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238. Through the Plain Error doctrine, the Court ruled that a record silent of a waiver of fundamental rights to; trial by jury; Self-incrimination; to confront one's accusers, and insufficient record and the plea is not intelligent or voluntary. That this type of error is Plain Error, and left uncorrected would amount to a miscarriage of justice. April

The record in the instant case speaks quite loudly and very clearly that the plea violated the Applicant's constitutional rights to the extent that the proceedings are not reliable and cannot be upheld. Thus, the Applicant's April 9, 1991 plea is void, and the error must be corrected. See Federal Rule 11; See also McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459.

The Applicant also contends his 14th amendment right was violated in that a miscarriage of justice has taken place by the very definition of the phrase;

Miscarriage of Justice - a grossly unfair outcome in a judicial proceeding, as when a defendant is convicted despite a lack of evidence on an essential element of the crime. (Black's Law Dictionary).

The Applicant was convicted of two (2) or more priors at the 1997 trial, which encompasses several essential elements, those being elements mandatory to enhance sentence.

The Applicant contends that this miscarriage of justice was manifest due to a lack of understanding of the law in relation to

the facts by himself, his counsel, the prosecution and the court. The facts are: the Applicant never had two or more priors for sentencing purposes. See sentencing transcript.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, "because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.' See <u>Johnson V. Zerbst</u>, 304 U.S. 458.

In the present case there is no evidence that the Applicant was aware of the consequences of April 9, 1991 plea, nor is there any evidence of sufficient legal three (3) strike from the record, both being essential elements of a charge of enhancement and in their absence, Applicant is "actually innocent" of the charge. As actual innocence is defined as; the absence of facts that are pre-requisites for the sentence given to the Applicant. (Black's Law Dictionary).

The record again is clear and indisputable, and points out the facts and lack of essential elements. Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court had made a ruling which stands on all fours with the Applicant's position in State v. Johnson, 2001, making the Applicant entitled to a same ruling under the equal protections clause of the 14th amendment. For the Court to continue to deny him is procompatible with the demands of Justice. Thus, the Applicant should be allowed to litigate upon this claim as the interests of justice are at stake.

ARGUMENT VIII

The Applicant further contends that his constitutional rights were violated in a manner that questions the judicial process by the violation of his 6th amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

The Applicant contends that errors committed by his trial counsel undermine the foundation of justice and the results of the proceedings that led to his conviction and sentence are unreliable and cannot be held as conclusive. Because, had counsel

not committed such critical errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. This was prejudicial.

Counsel first failed to object to illegal use of priors, statements made to the Court by the prosecution ouring Applicant's trial. The Solicitor falsely intormed the Court that it served Applicant notice under 17-25-45(H) and that priors exsisted for enhangement. See guilty plea April 9, 1991, exhibits 17-95.

No witness gave any such testimony and counsel should have made this known to the Court. See PCR transcript, where Applicant presents testimony from the witnesses and never mentioned this, it was not known. and qualitys as arfer 3; scalard avidence accepted)

The Solicitor deliberately presented false testimony to the Court and Applicant's counsel failed him by failing to object and correct this false testimony.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that; Deliberate deception of a Court and/or jurors is incompatible with the rudimentary demands of justice. See <u>Giglio v. U.S.</u>, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); See also <u>Washington v. State</u>, 324 S.C. 232, 478 S.E.2d 833 (1996).

The failure to act by the Applicant's counsel is unreasonable and falls below the norms of his profession. Applicant's right to effective assistance of counsel was violated in a plain and most harmful manner as the Court ruled upon the so-called facts given by the Solicitor and sentenced Applicant to the maximum term of confinement. Where had counsel corrected this false testimony by Solicitor, Applicant may have received the minimum term of confinement. Applicant second degree burglary non-violent as arrested for and charged at bond hearing. This failure to act by counsel became relevant because Applicant's position from the time of arrest and throughout proceedings was that a second degree non-violent burglary had been committed, not two or more. See trial transcript.

By counsel failing to inform the Applicant prior to pleading to April 9, 1991 burglaries, he consequently set up a scheme for unintelligent and involuntary decision to plead guilty without full knowledge of all his alternatives. One of which being that life without parole could be possible later offense of the charge of priors. At November 7, 1997 trial had not counsel advise Applicant to plea would not have been present as aggravating circumstance. Thus, counsel's representation fell below the standard of reasonableness, becoming a violation of Applicant's 6th amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See exhibits A-12, A-12 all indictments placed into the record show May 2, 1991 file, three weeks after April 9th plea. See exhibits X-V-Z, X-V-Z. It shows clearly all April 9th, 1991 indictments was for one twenty year plea got multiple convictions.

April 2013

Robert Graham Jr.

173037

6:14-cv-03518-TMC

CHY COMY COMPLY CED WOULD CLAMER

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Robert Graham Jr., #178039, Applicant,

vs.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT

OF COUNSEL PURSUANT TO

extrado nary Gircumstanea

- 1. Name of Applicant Robert Graham Jr.
- 2. This hag been the most complex and confusing case. Applicant has had major obstacles placed in his way of discovery or even having a lawyer at any stage of his case that even bothered to assertain how the law and facts could apply to his case.
- 3. In over sixteen (16) years of constantly fighting his case, Applicant has been unable to even get adjudication of claims or simply claims ruled upon by their merits, procedural defaults because of attorneys dropping the ball, and failing to properly investigate, do research or to even advise Applicant of exactly what he had to defend against.
- Applicant all though he had trial, PCR and Applicant attorney's to stand beside him during pretrial, post-trial and collateral proceedings.
- 5. Still Applicant didn't find out until (2013) the arguments, claims, and facts he now raises before this Honorable Court, because previous attorneys overlooked them, failed to raise them and didn't advise Applicant of the true merits of his case.
- 6. Boiler plate defenses were made and when Applicant through his investigation and discovery found out about procedural challenges blocked the door and placed iron curtains around the constitution; the evidence will probably change the results If a new Aid Is had (9) has been discovered since frial, and since (2002) per, mc paus cound not have Deen discovered before trial, as, it mus decidal in (2010) applicated was just provided with it to his innocence or quitt(5)

- 7. Applicant has study and learned on his own to come this far.
- 8. He still doesn't understand the requirements to meet conditions of this Court fully, or to properly represent all the vage blind spots in his case.
- 9. The Sixth Amendment does guarantee more than just a warm body to stand beside Applicant during critical stages of his case prejudicial representation is cause of any hurdles are court or this court may acknowledge.

I declare under penalty of perjury this is true. I <u>understand</u> if I'm granted a lawyer and later get financiallable, I must pay. If <u>answer to proceed are false</u> my case can be dismissed.

Date: April 2013

V. J. Ward-TV

Robert Graham Jr.

FILED

THE HONORABLE CONNIE R. BELL CLERK OF COURT, FLORENCE COUNTY 2013 MAY -2 PM 3: 11 180 NORTH IRBY STREET MSC-E FLORENCE, S.C. 29501

CONNIE REEL-SHEARIN CCCP & GS FLORENCE COUNTY, SC

Robert Graham Jr.,)	C/A NO.:
Applicant,))	2013-69-21-1195
vs.)	AFFIDAVIT
)	INDICTMENT NO. 97-GS-21-742
State of South Carolina,)	INDICTMENT NO. 97-GS-21-742 SCRCP RULE MOTION PURSUANT
Respondent (H.aL))	TO AFTER DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
•		MCEALLS 11. United States (2)

(1) I am the Applicant in the above entitled proceeding. I make this affidavit in support of a motion pursuant to SCRCP 29(b) and SCRCP, indictment No.: 97-GS-21-742, to vacate the judgement of conviction herein, upon the ground that 17-25-45(H). (2) I was indicted for second degree burglary non-violent and posted bail in the amount of \$10,000. I was tried by Honorable Hicks Harwell on November 7, 1997, sentenced to life without parole. (3) Evidence at trial was not available by prosecutor's own statement for the charge under above indictment and warrants attached for arrest. (4) The ground(s) for relief raised upon this motion has (have) not previously been determined on the merit upon a prior motion or proceeding in a court of this state, or upon an appeal from judgement or upon a prior motion or proceeding in a federal court.

Wherefore, I respectfully request that my conviction be vacated on the ground that as it may deem just and proper applicable]. WHEREFORE, I respectfully request an order of this court pursuant to after discovered evidence incorporated with Rule 29 and 60(b).

Applicant never got his full bite of the apple during 1997 trial, or PCR because after discovered evidence was not known to him at

SCRCP, three (3) day's ago,

Robert Graham

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF FLORENCE, S.C.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Robert Graham Jr. 2013 MAY -2 PM 3: 11 C/A NO.:

Applica # QNNIE REEL SHEATHN CCCP & GS FLORENCE COUNTY, SC

2013-cp-21-1195

vs.

State of South Carolina,) Respondent et al)

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL AFTER DISCOVERED EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO SCRCP 60(b) SCRCP 29 AND RULE 35

MCFALLS V. United States

Please allow this to surfice as Applicant's sworn affidavit causes of actions. Motion for a new filel, Summons,

Complaintievidentiary bearing 1. I am the Applicant in the above captioned action.

- 2. Regular communication by mail exists throughout the State of South Carolina and that this is a proper circumstance of service by mail, (Perry C.I.) mailroom staff.
- 3. I have this day served a copy of the Rule 29(b) and 60(c) motion for a new trial upon above Ruler by depositing same in the United States mail, postage prepaid. With Mis A-G, ANG X-Y-Z To include exhibit # 27/

6: Honorable Clerk Connie R. Bell 180 North Irby Street

MSC-E Florence, S.C. 29501

18JN INSTA April 22 2013

2450)

Melody Brown P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, S.C. 29211

Robert Graham Jr

RECEIVE APR 2 9 2015

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RECLIMATIROOM

6:14-cv-03518-TMC Date Filed 09/26/14 Entry Number 11-10 Page 27 of 32

FILED (2013-cp-11-2195)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2013 MAY -2 PM 3: || FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CONNIE REEL-SHEARIN

CCCP & GSUnited States v. McFalls (2005)
FLORENCE COUNTY. SC

01 p.65

Applicant's after-discovered evidence motion for a new trial is based on Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) because of nothing in applicant's April 9, 1991 guilty plea or November 1997 indictment for prior convictions were for crimes of (violence) under the guidelines, none of the attached exhibits or indictment numbers at trial established that applicant committed any crime of violence for [sentencing] - enhancement purposes, this was not discovered by the applicant, or any of his numerous attorneys during trial, first PCR (2002) or appeals attorney which was highly prejudicial to a fair trial, and ineffective counsel, see, United States v. McPalls, No. 08-5839, decided and filed January 28, 2010, the McFalls, ruling was not available to applicant during April 9, 1991 indictment plea, it also wasn't available to applicant during 1997 trial or appellate review which motion for after discovered evidence is based. This error of law deprived applicant of many substantial, and procedural due process of law, statutory, State and United State Constitutional rights to compulsory process, and the totality of the guaranteed due process right under the 14th Amendment to equal protection of the law, thus, catagorically, and substantively applicant is under pursuant to the McFalls ruling, an illgal sentence, and conviction for enhancement purposes. See trial page 86 - Line 4-6) the court, and solicitor was confused as to how to apply the crime of violence as to aggravating circumstances, for a crime of violence, under enhancement purposes, the court and solicitor argued between S.C. Code 17-25-45 And burglary statute section 16-11-311), see trial, pg. 83, line 8-14, solicitor advised the court I have no physical evidence, I have no physical evidence that I know of, the Florence Sheriff Department has none, inquired about that in parparation. McFalls case enhancement like this, applicant's three (3) prior convictions under the McFalls ruling for violating South Carolina Burglary

Statute should have been counted as a [single] sentence under the sentencing guidelines, because the three convictions were sentenced on the same day, and three offenses were not separated by an intervening arrest. Hence, motion for a new trial should be granted, in corporated with fact section of memorandum of law. to include exhibits A-E. . This could not have been discovered before frial, is mafferiall to applicants. The could not have been discovered before frial, is mafferiall to applicants.

April 22 2013
Florence, South Carolina

Robert Graham Jr. # 178039 P.C.I., Q 1 A - 206

430 Oaklawn Rd.

Pelzer, SC 29669

THE HONORABLE CONNIE R. BELL CLERK OF COURT, FLORENCE COUNTY 180 NORTH IRBY STREET

MSC		CE, S.C. 29501
		8013-CP-11-2195
Robert Graham Jr.,)	C/A NO.: 97 98 27 742
Applicant,)	
•	· }	NOTICE OF MOTION REQUESTING
)	ADEQUATE TRANSPORTATION TO
vs.)	HEARING AND ORDER OF
)	TRANSPORTATION AND PROPOSED
)	ORDER AND MOTION FOR
State of South Carolina	a,)	EVIDENTIARY HEARING PURSUANT
Respondent)	TO SCRCP 60(b) AND SCRCP 29(b)
	5	ce united states
		ce, united states mcFXLLs (2010),
Comes now, Robert G	raham Jr.	, #178039, by and through pro-se,
who would move the Co	ourt and	Respondent thereof, pursuant to
applicable law for a	hearing	on the merit of his allegations
fully adjucating his o	claim in	the above demonstrated matter at
the Florence County C	ourthouse	City County Complex, 180 North

Irby Street, Florence, S.C. 29501, order authorized department having custody and control of Applicant and that transport be executed fully for hearing on the beneath date.

This	_ day	of	 2013		IT 1	IS :	so	ORDERED	
					<u>s/</u>			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
				JUDGE:					

THE HONORABLE CONNIE R. BELL
CLERK OF COURT, FLORENCE COUNTY
180 NORTH IRBY STREET
MSC-E FLORENCE, S.C. 29501

Robert Granam Gr.,)	C/A	NO.:				
Applicant,) (201	3-	cp-	31	- 41	9 5
vs.)	тои	ICE O	F MOTIC	א ייט א	′ Δ ሮአጥሮ	
)			NT NO.			
State of South Carolina,)	PUR	SUANT	TO SCR	CD BIII	E 30(b))
Respondent	_)	MCF	AIIS	Vi	inife	stu-	fes
				(201		, ,	
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE t	that t	pon	the	annexe	d aff	idavit	of
duly s	worn to	the		dav of			2013
(and documents attache	ed the	reto)	and	unon	the		2013
instrument and		and	all	proces	dinos	accusa	Lory
held herein, Applicant	will	move	this	court	orngs at	previo	usiy
thereof, at	am	or as	Soor	there	after	Cerm,	Line
may be heard for: An ord	er pur	suant	to ab	ove in	dictor	as cou	nsei
was announced contrary	to a	nd v	iolato	ove Inc	TI C CHIEL	it sent	ence
Constitution or in cer	tain c	ircum	et and	so the	Onit	ea St	ates
Vacating the judgement e	ntered	again.	stance	es otn	er rec	deral	law.
the day of	2013	again	on On	ove nai	ned Ap	plicant	on
	-			20	,110W111	g grou	nas.
A							
В.							
Date:							
TO: State Attorney of Sou	th Caro	lina		Robe	rt Grai	ham Jr.	,

6:14-cv-03518-TMC Date Filed 09/26/14 Entry Number 11-10 Page 31 of 32

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Seeking Austine revew 17-27-100

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April <u>22</u> 2013 Florence, South Carolina Robert Graham Jr. # 178039 P.C.I., Q 1 A - 206

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